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REDEFINING DISPOSABLE INCOME IN
CHAPTER 13 PLANS: MOVING FORWARD
INTO A "NEW ERA IN THE HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW"i
LAUREN SYLVESTER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The system was not broken." 2 But as the amount of
bankruptcies began to dramatically rise in the early 1980s, more
and more creditors began to argue that the system was, in fact,
broken. 3 Congress attempted to repair that broken system by
enacting the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act ("BAPCPA").4
The goal of BAPCPA was two-fold: create uniform standards
in the bankruptcy process and limit judicial discretion.5 Still, the
overwhelming attitude of both debtors and bankruptcy judges was
that the system was not broken. 6 With many open disputes
concerning BAPCPA and its application, judges and debtors seem
to be longing for the old days. The question now is whether courts
can see beyond the past and accept the realities of a new era in
bankruptcy law.
* John Marshall Law School, May 2010. The author thanks Brian Berheide
and Janet Sylvester for their constant help and support.
1. U.S. Trustee Program, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eolbapcpalindex.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
2. In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742, 752 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
3. See James T. Hubler, The End Justifies the Means: The Legal, Social,
and Economic Justificationsfor Means Testing Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 309, 316-22 (2002) (describing the extensive
efforts that the credit industry undertook in lobbying Congress to make it
more difficult to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7). This lobbying later
convinced Congress to write the "substantial abuse test" into the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, through a 1984 amendment. Id. at 319-22.
4. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
5. See generally Christopher Frost, Plain Meaning and Unintended
Results Under BAPCPA: In re Kagenveama, 28 No. 8 BANKR. L. LETTER 1
(Aug. 2008) (explaining the goals of the BAPCPA and how they comport with
courts' interpretation of the statute).
6. In re Alexander, 344 B.R. at 752. See also In re Austin, 372 B.R. 668,
679-80 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (explaining that although the BAPCPA may have
unfortunate consequences for some, by departing from pre-BAPCPA policies,
courts must still apply the statute as intended and written by Congress).
1107
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Part II of this Comment will give a brief history of United
States bankruptcy law, describe the basics of BAPCPA and
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and explain the incorporation of the new
"means test" into Chapter 13. Part III will focus on just one of the
many current disputes under BAPCPA: the interpretation of
"projected disposable income" and "disposable income" under
Section 1325(b).7 This section will also analyze two distinct views
on the correct interpretation of these terms and weigh how these
views comport with Congress' purpose behind BAPCPA. Finally,
Part IV will propose an amendment to Section 1325(b) that
reconciles rules of statutory interpretation with the legislative
history and policy behind BAPCPA in order to solve the issue of
calculating projected disposable income. This amendment will
change the definition of disposable income to a percentage of the
debtor's income.

II.

BACKGROUND

A. A Brief History of Bankruptcy in the United States
The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to enact
uniform bankruptcy laws.8 Early bankruptcy laws treated debtors
as wrongdoers or criminals-imprisonment or even death for those
declaring bankruptcy was commonplace in the 1700s. 9 The late
1700s and 1800s marked a shift in bankruptcy laws, where
debtors began to be perceived as unfortunate, rather than
criminal. 10 This shift in perception resulted in a series of laws
that were passed and repealed along with economic busts and
booms. 1

7. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2006). Section 1325(b)(1)(B) provides that all
"projected disposable income.., will be applied to make payments to
unsecured creditors under the plan." Id. Section 1325(b)(2) defines the term
disposable income as "current monthly income.., less amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended." Id. § 1325(b)(2).
Section 1325 (b)(3) defines
amounts reasonably necessary to be expended as "determined in accordance
with ... section 707(b)(2)." Id. § 1325(b)(3). In other words, these expenses
are the same expenses laid out in the means test. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b)(2)(2006).
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. This section gives Congress the power to
"establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." Id.
9. Charles J. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer
Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 9, 28 (2007); see also Robert J. Landry, III &
Nancy Hisery Mardis, Comment, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors'
Prison Without Bars or "JustDesserts" for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 91, 117-18 (2006) (analyzing the varying views regarding the treatment

of bankruptcies throughout history).
10. Tabb, supra note 9, at 28.
11. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 107 (5th ed. 2006).
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Finally, the first bankruptcy law with lasting power was
enacted in 1898, which stayed in effect until repealed by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.12 Both of these laws had basic
13
policies that ultimately favored debtors.
1.

Modern Consumer Bankruptcy

The 1978 Code and the 2005 BAPCPA both provide for two
main forms of bankruptcy relief: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.14
Under Chapter 7, a debtor discharges pre-petition debts in return
for a relinquishment of non-exempt assets. 15 The overwhelming
majority of cases filed under Chapter 7 are "no asset" cases where
16
unsecured creditors receive no payment at all for debts owed.
On the other hand, under Chapter 13, a debtor must repay a
portion of debt with future earnings pursuant to a court-approved
plan. 17 While there are certain benefits of choosing to file under
Chapter 13, the dramatic increase in bankruptcies has been in
18
Chapter 7 filings.

12. See Hubler, supra note 3, at 315 (explaining that this first "fully modern
bankruptcy act" recognized the public interest in granting a discharge to
"honest but unfortunate debtors"); see also F. REGIS NOEL, HISTORY OF THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW 200 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2002) (1919) (providing a
history of bankruptcy and its perception in society). Noel described the state
of bankruptcy by stating that "[w]hile all concede that as long as men barter,
bankruptcy will be one of the evils of society, it is now regarded, not as a
crime, but as a misfortune, not as a disgrace, but as a malady which needs the
soothing remedy of sympathy and encouragement." Id.
13. See Landry & Mardis, supra note 9, at 95 (explaining that no
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code had altered the underlying policy in favor
of debtors until the 2005 BAPCPA, which represented a shift away from a
policy favoring debtors, toward one that favored creditors); see generally
Robert J. Landry, III, An Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Consumer
Bankruptcy: Will Bankruptcy Reform Really Change Anything?, 3 RUTGERS
BUS. L.J. 2 (2006) (claiming that the BAPCPA represents a fundamental
change in the philosophy which has underlined American bankruptcy law
since the advent of the first act in 1898; namely, that debtors are
fundamentally honest but unfortunate, as opposed to abusers of the
bankruptcy process).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1301 (2006).
15. Thomas Evans & Paul B. Lewis, An Empirical Economic Analysis of the
2005 Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 327, 329 (2008).
16. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 11, at 121.
17. Evans & Lewis, supra note 15, at 329-30.
18. See id. at 329-31 (explaining that incentives to file under Chapter 13
include: additional non-exempt property can be retained, additional debts can
be discharged that cannot be discharged in Chapter 7, and debtors can enjoy
more favorable treatment by creditors in credit ratings and willingness to
lend);
see
also
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.S.
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptcystats.htm (last visited Nov.
9, 2009) (reporting statistics on the number of bankruptcy petitions filed,
including the percentage filed under Chapter 7, as opposed to Chapter 13).
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2. The Credit Industry Pushes for Reform
Beginning in the 1960s, the credit industry intensified their
push for reforming the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). 19 Credit
companies wanted a mandate for debtors to use Chapter 13
20
instead of Chapter 7, so that they would receive a greater payout.
This push laid the groundwork for the 1984 amendment to the
1978 Code, which provided for dismissal or conversion to Chapter
13 if granting a discharge would be a "substantial abuse of the
system."'21 But the credit industry continued to lobby for further
22
reforms, still viewing the Code as too debtor friendly.
B.

The 2005 BAPCPA: 'A Long Time Coming"

When Senator Hatch addressed the Senate before the
BAPCPA was signed in 2005, he said, "[t]his bankruptcy bill has
been a long time coming," and it had. 23 In the late 1990s, the
number of bankruptcies rose dramatically. 24 In 1998, bankruptcy

19. Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving
Philosophy of Debtor Qualificationsfor Bankruptcy Discharge,62 ALB. L. REV.
467, 500 (1998).
20. See id. (explaining that credit companies began petitioning for forced
Chapter 13 bankruptcy for certain debtors); see also David A. Moss & Gibbs A.
Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?,
73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 320-21 (titling this point in the history of American
bankruptcy law as the "Second Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis and Death of a
Stigma").
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2005) (providing for dismissal if
granting relief constituted a "substantial abuse" of the system); see also
Coulson, supra note 19, at 468 (describing how creditor lobbying led to the
introduction of the "substantial abuse" regime); Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating
the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 476
(2007) (noting that the "substantial abuse" test was added into the code in
1984, despite the 1978 Code's legislative history directly rejecting the idea
that the debtor's ability to repay could be used as a basis for dismissing a
Chapter 7 case); Hubler, supra note 3, at 317-20 (describing how lobbying
efforts by the credit industry led Congress to include the "substantial abuse"
test" in the amended Bankruptcy Code of 1978). The "substantial abuse" test
allowed judges to dismiss the case or transfer a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13
if the judge determined that allowing a debtor to liquidate would be a
"substantial abuse" of the system. Id. at 319.
22. See Paul M. Black & Michael J. Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A
Critique of the 1984 Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19
U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 845 (1985) (explaining that the 1978 Code was seen as
favoring bankrupts and was "branded a debtor's paradise practically
beckoning borrowers to shed their debts painlessly and needlessly"); see also
Hubler, supra note 3, at 318-19 (describing the credit industry's push for
reform, seeking to limit access to Chapter 7 and mandate Chapter 13 for some
debtors).
23. 151 CONG. REC. S2459-01, S2459 (Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
24. See Landry, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that before President Bush
took office there was not enough support to pass a major reform of the
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filings exceeded one million for the first time in United States
history. 25 Creditors became increasingly concerned with debtors
liquidating under Chapter 7 and abusing the bankruptcy system. 26
In response, in 1994 the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
was established, and the coming years were peppered with several
attempts to amend the Code. 27 In 2000, the 106th Congress passed
a major bankruptcy reform bill similar to the future BAPCPA,
however, President Clinton vetoed the bill.28
Congress adopted the view that the increase in consumer
bankruptcy filings was due to debtors abusing the system,
including: lack of personal financial accountability, the
proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight
to eliminate abuse in the system. 29 When President Bush came
30
into office, Congress found the support for BAPCPA it needed.

Bankruptcy Code). Still, after Bush's election, the reform was delayed until
his re-election because of the distractions caused by the terrorist attack on
September l1th and the war in Iraq. Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 3-4 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 98; see also Landry, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that at least
ten percent of all American households have gone through the bankruptcy
system).
26. See Stephan Labaton, Bankruptcy Bill Set for Passage; Victory for Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al (naming the main lobbying forces for the 2005
BAPCPA as a coalition, including: Visa, Mastercard, the American Bankers
Association, MBNA America, Capital One, Citicorp, The Ford Motor Credit
Company, and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation). Beginning in
1989, this coalition spent more than forty million dollars in political
fundraising and millions more in lobbying efforts. Id. One commentator noted
that "[t]he bankruptcy bill was written by and for credit card companies."
Paul Krugman, The Debt-Peonage Society, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A23.
Krugman analogizes the BAPCPA to the debt peonage society after the Civil
War in which debtors had to work for their creditors to pay down their debts.
Id. Krugman claims that the bill "won't get us back to those bad old days all
by itself, but it's a significant step in that direction." Id.
27. See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 48
(providing a legislative history of BAPCPA from the creation of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission in 1994, to BAPCPA's review and passage in
the 108th and 109th Congresses); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 6
(explaining that Congress considered proposed reforms to the Code for nearly
eight years).
28. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United
States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 1-2 (2001); see also Labaton, supra note 26, at Al
(calling BAPCPA a "thinly disguised gift to banks and credit card companies,"
which critics contend are responsible for the high rate of bankruptcy by
promoting predatory credit lending).
29. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2; see also 151 CONG. REC. S2459-01,
S2459 (describing how BAPCPA was a response to abusive filings and how the
means test would remedy the abuse by restricting access to Chapter 7 for
those with high incomes).
30. White House Press Release, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. S7 Statement by
President of the United States, Statement of President George W. Bush upon
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Upon signing the bill, President Bush declared that this "common
sense" reform would ensure that Americans had access to
31
affordable credit.
There was criticism, however, that the credit companies, who
lobbied for these changes, inundated the recently bankrupt with
32
credit card offers so that debtors would accumulate more debt.
In addition, many scholars argued that the increase in the
consumer credit market led to the change, rather than abuse of the
system.33 These dissenters did not see the BAPCPA as a common
sense decision; rather, they saw it as a measure which failed to
solve the true underlying problems leading to bankruptcy:
unemployment, inadequate health insurance, failing small
34
businesses, and natural disasters.
Whether properly addressing the cause of skyrocketing
bankruptcy filings or not, BAPCPA went into effect in October of
2005. 3 5
Some of the new requirements included additional
calculations, additional documentations, and reduced discretion
for both judges and debtors in choosing between a Chapter 7
Signing S. 256, 57 (Apr. 20, 2005).

31. Id.
32. Editorial, Trying to Have It Both Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at
A30.
33. See Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion:
Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 36-38 (1998) (explaining
that bankruptcy filings are a symptom of too much debt, not the cause).
Sommer makes an analogy to tobacco use, explaining that people who smoke
are not making a good decision but "no one suggests closing the cancer wards."
Id. at 41-42. Abuses of the bankruptcy system are episodic, not systemic, and
increases in filings are a symptom of societal problems, not abuse. Stephan
Labaton, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill; Overhaul Now Awaits President's
Signature, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at C5. The BAPCPA was "a "victory for
Bush... [a] setback for civil rights, labor and consumer organizations." Id.
34. See Elizabeth Warren, Show Me the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005,
at A21 (discussing the huge number of bankruptcy bills pending after
hurricanes, including three new bankruptcy bills pending due to Hurricane
Katrina). Warren states that "becadse those problems aren't going away any
time soon, the need to restore common sense to the bankruptcy system will not
go away either." Id. After Katrina, lawmakers suggested relief from the strict
new bankruptcy code provisions, but House Republicans rejected any
exemption for the victims. Mary Williams Walsh & Riva D. Atlas, Storm
Victims May Face Curbs on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al.
When Congress initially agreed to making a more strict Code, however, "no
one had the victims of Hurricane Katrina in mind." Id.
The article also
reported a finding that "bankruptcy filings usually reach a peak two to three
years after a hurricane." Id. Wisconsin congressman F. James Sensenbrenner
Jr., a sponsor of the bankruptcy law, stated that those who lost the fight
against the new rule should "get over it". Editorial, Congress and Katrina,A
Bankrupt Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A20. What most bankruptcies
have in common is a huge setback beyond the debtors' control. Id.
35. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11

U.S.C.)
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liquidation and Chapter 13 plan. 36 BAPCPA was an attempt to
reconcile the clash between competing ideals: the right to a fresh
start and personal responsibility for incurring debt.37 The idea
behind the reform was simple-any debtor who can pay, must
pay.

38

C. The Means Test
The most important and telling change in the Code was
Congress' promulgation of the rigid "means test," which was
considered the cure for the systemic abuse of the bankruptcy
system. 39 The means test created a formula designed to weed out
the feared abusers of the bankruptcy system. 40 If a debtor "fails"
the means test, he is pushed from Chapter 7 liquidation into a

Chapter 13 payout plan. 4 1 In addition, Congress incorporated the
means test into Chapter 13 to define "projected disposable
income," the consequences of which is the focus of this Comment.
The means test was the end result of creditors' forty-year
lobbying effort to preference Chapter 13 plans, under which
42
debtors would be forced to make payments on debts over time.

Congress accepted this position, despite research showing that
Chapter 13 plans had poor success rates, often paying out nothing
to unsecured creditors. 43 Under BAPCPA's means test, debtors

36. Evans & Lewis, supra note 15, at 332-38.
37. See Leslie Eaton, The Nation: Debt's Honor; Bankruptcy, the American
Morality Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al (indicating that the BAPCPA
tried to reconcile the interests of credit card lobbyists with the "fresh start"
philosophy of American bankruptcy law).
38. Id.
39. See Pardo, supra note 21, at 472 (calling the means test the "panacea"
for abuse and describing it as a formulaic approach by which courts presume
abuse for debtors who seem to be able to pay past debts with future income);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
571, 571 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1) (stating that the purpose of
BAPCPA is "to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the
system is fair for both debtors and creditors").
40. See 151 CONG. REC. S2459-01, S2459 (describing how the means test
will allow stricter access to Chapter 7 for those with high incomes); see also
Official
Bankruptcy
Form
22A,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK Forms_08_Official/B_022A0108f.pdf
(laying out the entire means test in worksheet form).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006) (codifying the means test and providing for
"dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under [C]hapter... 13").
42. Tabb, supra note 28, at 9.
43. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTcY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE
NEXT TWENTY YEARS, NATIONAL BANKRuPTcY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL
REPORT Vol. I, 233-34 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc., Buffalo, NY (2000)) (1997)
(explaining that two-thirds of Chapter 13 plans fail before the debtor
completes the payout plan and sometimes even before unsecured creditors
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must affirmatively show that they qualify for relief under Chapter
7.44
Proponents of the means test defend it as an effort to
encourage debtors to accept the consequences of their behavior and
45
force them to attempt to pay debts within their means.
Failing the means test indicates a "presumption of abuse"
under the BAPCPA.46 This presumption drastically changed the
perspective of bankruptcy and represented a stringent standard,
eliminating the judicial discretion inherent in the "substantial
47
abuse" standard used in the 1978 Code.
1.

CurrentMonthly Income

"Current monthly income" ("CMI") is the first calculation
under the means test. 48 A debtor calculates CMI by averaging all
sources of income over the six months prior to filing for
bankruptcy. 49 Many commentators have criticized this approach
to calculating income, which is not always current, not always
receive anything). The Commission cites reasons for failure, including
repeated financial difficulties, health emergencies, and "unrealistic plans that
are "doomed from the inception." Id. at 234.
The Commission blatantly
states that Chapter 13 "does not guarantee meaningful repayment to
unsecured creditors." Id.
44. Landry & Mardis, supra note 9, at 105.
45. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 244 (2001) (explaining that the reform could
potentially discourage those who deserve relief from filing or prevent the
needy from discharging their debts). The push for a "means test" may
represent a shift in the public's perception concerning entitlement programs
and the public's view of recipients of public benefits. Id.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (providing that the court should
"presume abuse exists if" the debtor fails to pass the means test); see also
Official Bankruptcy Form 22A, supra note 40 (requiring practitioners to check
one of two boxes: "[t]he presumption arises" or "[t]he presumption does not
arise").
47. Pardo, supra note 21, at 473-77 (contrasting the judicial discretion
inherent in the 1978 Code with the BAPCPA). Under the 1978 Code, a judge
had discretion to determine that a debtor was abusing the system, and could
dismiss or convert the case to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Id. at 478-79. Under
BAPCPA, the credit lobby took this even further to provide a test by which the
system could presume abuse and force a debtor into Chapter 13. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(1).
Section 101 defines the term current
monthly income as, "the average monthly income from all sources that the
debtor receives ... without regard to whether such income is taxable income,
derived during the 6-month period" prior to filing. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)
(2006). Income includes all income paid to the debtor or household payments
to dependents but excludes income from Social Security and payments to war
crimes and victims of terrorism. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B).
49. 11 U.S.C. 101(10A); Official Bankruptcy Form 22A, supra note 40, at
Part II (providing a worksheet to calculate current monthly income for a
Chapter 7 debtor); see also Official Bankruptcy Form 22C, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK Forms_08_Official/B_022C_0108f.pdf
(providing worksheet for debtor to calculate "Statement of Current Monthly
Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income").
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monthly, and not always even income. 50
If a debtor's CMI multiplied by twelve is at or below the state
median for the same-size household, the debtor may essentially
forego the rest of the means test and file under Chapter 7.51 If, on
the other hand, a debtor is above the state median, then the rest of
the means test must be completed to determine if a "presumption
52
of abuse arises."
2. Standard IRS Deductions
After determining CMI, a debtor who is above the median
income can deduct standard expenses that have been determined
by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 53
These include
54
"National Expenses," "Local Expenses," and "Other Expenses."
The guidelines are incorporated into BAPCPA to determine
allowable expenses of above-median income debtors in Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcies.5 5 In Chapter 13 cases, the expenses
are deducted from CMI to determine the "disposable income" of a

50. See Philip S. Hurak, Comment, Issues with the Title 11 § 101(10A)
Definition of "Current Monthly Income' It's Not Current, Not Monthly, and
Not Always Income, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 177, 179-81 (2006) (noting issues
with calculating CMI within the six months prior to filing, including: lost
employment in the last six months, decrease in wages, or irregular sources of
income); see also Richard I. Aaron, Special Issue: Equal Access to Justice,
Access to Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy, 2006 UTAH. L. REV. 925, 942 (2006)

(explaining that 101(10A) reflects gross income by stating, "without regard to
whether such income is taxable income," however, the "debtor receives"
language suggests net income).
51. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). This section explains expense deductions,
stating that, "the debtor's monthly expenses [are] specified under the National
Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for
the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the IRS for the
area in which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of the order for relief."
Id. The IRS deductions are outlined in the official forms. See generally Official
Bankruptcy Form 22A, supra note 40, at Part V; Official Bankruptcy Form
22C, supra note 49, at Part IV.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see also Official Bankruptcy Form 22A,
supra note 40, at Part V (directing a debtor whose current monthly income is
higher than median to deduct IRS expenses to determine if the presumption
arises).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see also IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, P.L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (outlining the standards used by the
IRS); 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(1) (2006) (laying out the standards which are
incorporated into BAPCPA); Clifford J. White III & David A. Levine, BAPCPA
Implementation Update: Changes to the Official Means Test Forms and IRS
Standards Effective Jan. 1, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 (2008) (listing the

changes to BAPCPA, including the addition of out-of-pocket health care costs
to national expenses, cell phone usage expenses to local expenses, and greater
expenses for vehicle ownership to local standards).
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debtor with CMI greater than the state median. 56
While BAPCPA uses the IRS guidelines for similar purposes,
the IRS originally published these guidelines solely for evaluating
payment plans for delinquent taxpayers.57 The standards alone
have led to much controversy, including their incorporation into

Chapter 13.58
D.

CalculatingProjected Disposable Income for Above-Median
Income Debtors in Chapter 13

Chapter 13 uses CMI much like Chapter 7, differentiating
between above and below-median income debtors.5 9 Both above
and below-median income debtors are required to apply all their
"projected disposable income" over the life of a plan for it to be
confirmed. 60 However, Section 1325 provides that above-median

56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006) (providing that "disposable income" is
"current monthly income received by the debtor.., less amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (defining "amounts
reasonably necessary to be expended" as "determined in accordance with
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2)"); 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (laying
out IRS standards that are deducted from "current monthly income"); Official
Bankruptcy Form 22C, supra note 49, at Part IV (directing an above-median
income Chapter 13 debtor to deduct IRS expenses from income).
57. See Matthew Stephenson & Kristin Hickman, The Administrative Law
of Borrowed Regulations: Legal Questions Regarding the Bankruptcy Law's
Incorporation of IRS Standards, 2008 No. 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1
(2008) (explaining that the IRS standards were developed to encourage
uniformity in evaluating installment agreement proposals for IRS
delinquents). Incorporating these standards into BAPCPA not only limits
discretion, but also has administrative law implications as to what extent
bankruptcy courts defer to IRS interpretations of these standards, and what
happens when the IRS modifies the standards. Id.
58. See Hon. Keith M. Lundin, The IRS Sneezes and the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules Catches Cold, 2007 No. 11 NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER 2 (2007) (questioning whether the IRS Manual, which comments on
the standards, should be incorporated into the BAPCPA, even though not
stated within). These standards are not rules that are familiar to lawyers and
courts, and the rules represent a "broken foundation for fundamental aspects
of consumer bankruptcy." Id. Furthermore, it is unclear what the result
should be under BAPCPA when the IRS revises its standards. Id. Compare
Case Summary, No "Means Test" Deduction for Vehicle Owned Outright,
WEST. BANKR. NEWSL., July 25, 2007, at 14 (reporting on a case of first
impression where a Washington court held that the debtor could not deduct
IRS standard ownership expense for a vehicle she owned outright), and
Featured Article, Debtors Could Deduct Car Ownership Expenses, WEST.
BANKR. NEWSL., Apr. 18, 2007, at 2 (reporting that a Wisconsin court ruled
that the debtors could deduct IRS standard ownership expenses, even though
they owned their car outright and had no monthly payments).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3). Here, the Code defines "amounts reasonably
necessary to be expended" differently depending on whether a debtor's CMI is
below or above state median. Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). "[A]ll of the "debtor's projected disposable
income to be received ... will be applied to make payments" under the plan.

Redefining Disposable Income in Chapter 13

2009]

1117

income debtors not only use CMI, but also IRS expense deductions
to calculate disposable income. 61 A Chapter 13 filer calculates
CMI and subtracts the applicable IRS expenses in order to
determine the amount that the debtor will have available to pay
out to creditors. 62 In addition, CMI determines whether the length
of the payout plan or "applicable commitment period" will be three
63
or five years.
A problem arises when an above-median income debtor's
disposable income calculation results in an abnormally large or
small number. 64 When faced with a debtor with a zero or negative
disposable income, some courts have decided not to apply the
definition of disposable income from Section 1325, instead
considering other factors not written into the Code.65 Courts are
now struggling with yet another unsolved puzzle of BAPCPA: can
the plain meaning of Section 1325 permit such an interpretation?
III.

ANALYSIS

This Section will analyze the two basic approaches that courts
take when interpreting "disposable income" and "projected
disposable income." This Section will also determine how these
approaches comport with rules of statutory interpretation.
Finally, this Section will evaluate the other considerations that
courts make when giving meaning to Section 1325: legislative
history, policy, and judicial function.
A.

Two Divergent Views: "The InterpretiveDivide"

Courts have interpreted many portions of BAPCPA in a
contradictory manner, what has been called an "interpretive
divide."6 6
In analyzing Section 1325, there are two main
Id.

Both above and below median debtors begin the disposable income
calculation with CMI. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (defining "disposable income"); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (providing a definition for expense deduction pursuant to
IRS Expenses laid out in 707(b)(2)); Official Bankruptcy Form 22C, supra note
49 (laying out the calculations for Chapter 13 debtors in worksheet form).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (defining "applicable commitment period");
see also Official Bankruptcy Form 22C, supra note 49 (providing a worksheet
calculation for commitment period). Chapter 13 debtors are directed to check
one of two boxes: "[t]he applicable commitment period is 3 years" or "[t]he
applicable commitment period is 5 years." Id.
64. See generally Jeffrey R. Drobish, Note, The Forbidden Crystal Ball:
Interpreting "ProjectedDisposable Income" for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plans
After BAPCPA, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 185, 197-205 (2007).
65. See id. (describing the issue of abnormally high, low, or negative
number under BAPCPA and proposing an amendment that makes the means
test calculation a starting point for determining "disposable income").
66. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 531 (2004) (describing the split
in courts when interpreting Section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code).
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"camps."67 The first camp advocates that the disposable income
calculation is merely a "starting point," while the second camp
claims that this "historical" income (means test) calculation is the
68
only consideration for determining disposable income.
1.

The "StartingPoint"Approach

The first of the divergent views and the self-proclaimed
"majority view" is the "starting point" or "forward-looking"
approach. 69
Under this view, courts have determined that
"projected disposable income" has a broader meaning than
"disposable income" defined in Section 1325(b)(2).70 Most of these
courts see the means test calculation as the starting point or floor
from which to calculate projected disposable income. 7 1 The
Starting Point courts, therefore, believe that BAPCPA did not
72
remove judicial discretion in determining disposable income.
The Starting Point proponents include many "sub-camps"
with different views of what should be considered looking
forward. 73 For example, some courts claim that the means test
calculation creates a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome
with evidence of changed circumstances.7 4 Other courts advocate
using IRS schedules I and J, in addition to Form B22C, to
calculate disposable income. 75
The numerous variations in
67. See In re McCarty, 376 B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (noting
that there are two main "camps" when considering the issue of disposable
income); In re LaPlana, 363 B.R. 259, 264 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (stating
that "two approaches have evolved" in evaluating projected disposable
income).
68. In re McCarty, 376 B.R. at 823-25.
69. See In re Grant, 364 B.R. 656, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007) (describing
the "forward looking" approach as the "majority view"); see also In re Meek,
370 B.R. 294, 301 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (calling this approach the "flexible"
approach).
70. In re LaPlana,363 B.R. at 265.
71. See In re Grant, 364 B.R. at 667 (claiming that Form B22C is the
starting point for determining "projected disposable income"); In re Briscoe,
374 B.R. 1, 13 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007) (stating that "most courts" concluded that
Form 22C is only a starting point).
72. In re Grant, 364 B.R. at 667.
73. See Hon. Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, PrincipledPrinciples
of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of
BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 221-24 (2007) (describing the variance in
opinions among those advocating a forward looking view).
74. See In re May, 381 B.R. 498, 506-07 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (claiming
that "a "rebuttable presumption inherently arises using the figures set forth
on Form 22C as a starting point"); see also In re Meek, 370 B.R. at 303
(providing a list of other courts which adhere to the rebuttable presumption
approach); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal
at 18, In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008) (arguing for a method
where the historical number is "presumptively applied" and then adjusted for
changes in income).
75. See In re Plumb, 373 B.R. 429, 436 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2007) (stating
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interpretation create doubt about the validity of this approach.7 6
2. The "Historical"Approach
The second camp, called the "Historical approach," takes the
position that projected disposable income must be calculated solely
as laid out in the means test. 77 In other words, projected
disposable income is merely the disposable income calculation
from Section 1325(b), "projected" over the "applicable commitment
period" or plan length.7 8 Thus, the Historical approach courts
claim that BAPCPA removed judicial discretion in calculating
disposable income in any other way than as defined in Section
1325.
B. Statutory Interpretation:Fitting a "SquarePeg" into a
"Round Hole"79
Both camps ground their interpretation of the term "projected
disposable income" in principles of statutory interpretation.8 0 But
the rules and norms of statutory interpretation alone often spark
debate; one academic cleverly wrote:
My brother Foster's penchant for finding holes in statutes reminds
one of the story told by and ancient author about the man who ate a
pair of shoes. Asked how he liked them, he replied that the part he
liked best was the holes. That is the way my brother feels about
statutes; the more holes they have in them the better he likes them.
81
In short, he doesn't like statutes.

that debtors must also take into consideration Schedule I and J); see also In re
Edmunds, 350 B.R. 636, 649-50 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (recognizing a court's
desire to consider income and expenses indicated on Schedules I and J or other
evidence).
76. Compare In re May, 381 B.R. at 508 (explaining that the hybrid
approach "looks to Schedule I for income and Form 22C for expenses), with In
re Reis, 377 B.R. 777, 786 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (claiming that the court must
project both expenses and income), and In re Gonzales, 388 B.R. 292, 299
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (asserting that there are five components of "projected
disposable income" and laying out a flowchart for analyzing them).
77. In re Alexander, 344 B.R. at 749-50; In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802, 811-12
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); see also In re Meek, 370 B.R. at 301 (calling this the
"mathematic" approach); In re Purdy, 373 B.R. 142, 150 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
2007) (describing this approach as the "literal" approach).
78. In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 679; see also In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868,
871-72 (9th Cir. 2008) (calling this the "most natural reading of the statute").
79. Waldron & Berman, supra note 73, at 213.
80. Id. at 224.
81. Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, HARV. L. REV. 616,
634 (1949).
In the hypothetical The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, the
court is tasked with determining whether trapped cave explorers violated a
murder statute stating that "[w]hoever shall willfully take the life of another
shall be punished by death" when they killed and ate a fellow spelunker to
survive. Id. at 616-19.
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Basic statutory interpretation begins with the statute as written,
or its plain meaning, and only goes beyond this if the results are
ambiguous or absurd.8 2 On the other hand, "courts should not
attempt to fit the square peg of ambiguity into the round hole of
83
plain meaning."
Perhaps the two camps interpreting Section 1325 are
employing both errors of interpretation:
finding holes in the
statute where there are none, and attempting to fit the square peg
of "projected disposable income" into the round hole of plain
meaning.
1. PlainMeaning Under the Starting PointApproach
Courts following the Starting Point approach claim that the
Historical approach fails to fully acknowledge the word
"projected," which must be given meaning.8 4 These courts point
out that "projected" is, by definition, future-oriented.8 5 The
Starting Point courts cite many different dictionary definitions for
the word "projected," including "to plan, figure or estimate for the
future and; to throw or cast forward."8 6 Thus, under this
approach, courts may consider changes in circumstances, including
increases and decreases in income and expenses when calculating
87
projected disposable income.
Some have suggested that the Historical approach fails to
give meaning to two other statutory phrases: "to be received" and
"will be applied to make payments."88 In an amicus curiae brief,
the United States argued that all of these statutory phrases are
future-oriented and that using the means test alone gives only a

82. See Waldron & Berman, supra note 73, at 195 (laying out the standard
approach to statutory interpretation, in which courts look at the language of
the statute, dictionary definitions, and additional sources beyond the statute
only if the result is ambiguous or absurd).
83. Id. at 213.
84. In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 146; see also In re Grant, 364 B.R. at 666
(reasoning that the alternative approach "would effectively serve to judicially
write those terms out of the statute").
85. In re LaPlana, 363 B.R. at 265. The opinion also provides a list of
courts agreeing with the forward-looking approach. Id.
86. In re May, 381 B.R. at 506; see also In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. at 13
(quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. XII at 599 (2d ed. 1989)) (defining
"projected" as "[p]redicted; calculated or forecast[ed] on the basis of current
trends or data"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Reversal, supra note 74, at 14 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY 1813 (1993)) (defining the term "projected" as 'planned for future
execution: contrived, proposed,"' as "[projected] outlays for new plant and
equipment"').
87. In re LaPlana, 363 B.R. at 266; In re Purdy, 373 B.R. at 146-47; In re
May, 381 B.R. at 505-06; In re Grant, 364 B.R. at 664-65.
88. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal,
supra note 74, at 15-16.
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"deemed or hypothetical" calculation of disposable income-s 9
In addition, Starting Point courts utilize the canons of
interpretation to point out that when Congress includes specific
language in one part of a statute but omits it in the other, its
actions are "intentional and purposefuL"9 0 Using this reasoning,
these courts argue that the future-oriented projected disposable
income cannot be the same as the historical-oriented disposable
income. 9 In their view, the language is -irreconcilable" with the
alternative approach, which effectively writes the word -projected"
out of the statute. 92
2.

PlainMeaning Under the HistoricalApproach

The Historical approach, on the other hand, notes that the
definition of "disposable income" provided in Section 1325 must
have some meaning in interpreting the term "projected disposable
income."I The term "disposable income" is used in only two places
in Section 1325: Section 1325(b)(1)(b), providing for projected
disposable income to be applied to the plan, and Section
1325(b)(2), defining disposable income.w This approach argues
that if disposable income is not linked to -projected disposable
income7 then disposable income would be a "floating definition
with no apparent purpose."
Instead, disposable income dearly
provides a formula for calculating projected disposable income. 6

89. Id- at 13-16.

'These are more than mere policy objections to the

bankruptcy court's interpretation; they are critical textual flaws." Md at 15.

90. In re May, 381 B. at 50691. Md; see also In re Guzman, 345 B-R. 640, 645 (Bankr. ED. WIs&2006)
(calling Form B22C a "rear view mirror" and Schedules I and J a "crystal
bail").
92. In re Grant,364 B-II at 665-66; see also Kibbe v. Sumski (In re Kibbe),

361 B-R. 302, 312 (RAP. 9th Cir. 2007) (calling the historical-looking
'disposable income" and forward-looking "projected" income "irreconcilable");
In re Spurgeon, 378 B.IL 197, 204 (Bankr. E). Tenn. 2007) (describing this as
an "illogical comparison of future expenses and past income").

93. See In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 677-78 (noting that the only phrase that is
defined in quotes in that in Section 1325 is "disposable income"); see also Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 74, at
19 (admitting that because disposable income is only used in two places, the

definition must have some meaning)- "Congress may well have expected" that
the historical calculation would be larger and -the fact that this is often not
the case does not authorize a court to ignMoe the statutory definition all

together." Id. at 20.
94. See In re Kagenweama, 541 F.3d at 872-73 (explaining that because it is

used only in two places the opposite view "would render as surplusage the
definition 'disposable income' found in § 1325(bX2)" and that there "can be no
reason for § 1325(bX2) to exist other than to define the term 'disposable
income').
95. In re Aehmnder, 344 B-IL at 749.
96 See Brief of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys at 4, In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d 868 (2008) available at

1122

The John MarshallLaw Review

[42:1107

Furthermore, Historical courts deny failing to give the term
"projected" meaning. 97 Instead, they claim projected means the
same thing as it did pre-BAPCPA; disposable income is to be
projected over the "applicable commitment period" or plan
length. 98 In this view, the term "projected" is merely an adjective
modifying disposable income. 99
Not only do Historical courts claim that they give meaning to
the word "projected," but they also claim that Starting Point courts
"strain" and "distort" the meaning of the word "projected."100
Thus, Historical courts note that the statute is not ambiguous, and
using the test laid out in Section 1325 is not absurd.1 01
In addition, this approach counters the rebuttable
presumption method by pointing out that there is no test in
Section 1325 that creates a rebuttable presumption by its plain
meaning. 102 The 2005 amendments show that Congress knew how
to create a rebuttable presumption when it did so with the
"presumption of abuse" standard used in the means test.1 03
http://www.nacba.org/about/briefs-list.php#43 [hereinafter Brief of NACBA]
(explaining that 1325(b) "provides a clear and specific formula").
97. In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 675.
98. See In re Brady, 361 B.R. 765, 772 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (explaining how
the term "projected" has the same meaning as it did pre-BAPCPA since that
section was not amended). There was no amendment to the phrase "projected
disposable income," only the addition of the definition of "disposable income."
Id.
99. In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 675. If Congress meant 'projected disposable
income' to mean something different from 'disposable income"' projected into
the future, it could have indicated this by including those three words in
quotation marks to signal "a separate phrase with a separate meaning." Id. at
677.
100. See id. at 678 (stating that the other decisions "strain and distort the
meaning of 'projected' beyond the common understanding of that word"); see
also In re Alexander, 344 B.R. at 752 (claiming that courts under the opposite
view were "fixing on isolated words such as... 'projected' and inflating their
meaning beyond justification"); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. D.
Utah 2007) (noting that "one word clearly should not be elevated in
importance so as to gut an entire statutory scheme enacted by Congress").
101. See In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 679 (explaining that differences of opinion
based on policy of BAPCPA "do[es] not make the statute ambiguous or the
results absurd"); see also In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d at 875 (stating that the
plain text of 1325(b) is not absurd); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. at 747 (stating
that they would not call the statute absurd just because "it leads to results
that are not aligned with the old law"); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. at 502 (noting
that "a harsh or even illogical result is not the same thing as an absurd
result").
102. In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d at 875; Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at
10-11.
103. See In re Kagenveama, 541 F.3d at 875 (pointing out that Congress
knows how to create a presumption, and could have included one, but chose
not to); see also Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at 11 (stating that "[t]he 2005
amendments to the Code make clear that Congress knew how to create a
presumption").
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Historical courts also argue against a position that
incorporates IRS Schedules I and J, as some Starting Point courts
propose. 0 4 First, the statute states that expense amounts "shall"
(or must) be determined according to the means test. 0 5 In
addition, Historical courts argue that incorporating IRS Schedules
I and J is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute since
Section 1325 explicitly excludes from income items that are
included on Schedule I as income. 10 6 This result, unlike the result
of using historical data to determine income, is absurd under the
07
plain language of the statute.
C. Beyond PlainMeaning: Legislative History, Policy, and the
JudicialFunction
Despite the claim that both viewpoints use a plain meaning
approach, both camps also look to legislative history, policy, and
108
the role of the judiciary to support their positions.
1.

Legislative History, Policy, and the Judicial Function
Under the Starting PointApproach

Starting Point courts support their view of projected
disposable income by noting that Congress intended to ensure that
debtors able to repay their debts do so. 10 9 They focus on BAPCPA

104. In re McCarty, 376 B.R. 819, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). In addition,
these courts note that Congress specifically excluded information that is
included on I and J, contradicting the notion that they should be incorporated.

Id.
105. See In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224, 228-29 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)
(stating that "what the debtor lists as expenses on his Schedule J, outrageous
or not, is beside the point"); see also Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at 9-11
(noting that the word "shall" demonstrates the statute, as amended by
Congress, "now requires" the projection of a number determined in accordance
with Section 1325(b)(2)).
106. Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at 15-16; see also In re McCarty, 376
B.R. at 825 (noting that Schedules I and J were used to calculate "projected
disposable income" pre-BAPCPA and "th[e] court is not free to ignore revised
section 1325(b)"). The court explicitly excluded certain items reflected on
forms I and J such as child support payments. Id. at 825.
107. Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at 12, 14 (noting that the results under
the alternative views would be absurd).
108. See In re Grant,364 B.R. at 661 (citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424 (1981)) (explaining that when a statute is unambiguous, the first canon of
interpretation "is also the last" and '"judicial inquiry is complete"'). Thus, if
the statute is, as the courts argue, unambiguous, they would have no need to
support their positions with these arguments.
109. See In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. at 15, 17 (stating that since either
interpretation "must do violence to the 'plain meaning,"' Congress' intent to
make those who can afford to pay, pay, should be effectuated); see also In re
Spurgeon, 378 B.R. at 203 (claiming that Congress meant to increase
disposable income in general to increase payments on unsecured claims); 151
CONG. REC. S2459-01, S2470 (illustrating Congress' intent to increase payout
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as a response to the concern that some debtors were abusing the
system-HO
These courts emphasize their view with both indications of
congress-nal intent and underlying policy objectives."" Courts
using the Starting Point view defend this method by noting that it
is consistent with the aims and objectives of BAPCPA,7 which
intended Chapter 13 to "be malleable? and to provide a "realistic
determination
of ability to pay."'2
Similarly, courts that
incorporate IRS Schedules I and J seem to think that these
documents are somehow more realistic and provide a "financial
different from Form 22C.' 3
real
bm~lly, many Starting Point courts look to judicial function,
a
that the "rigid" and "mechanicalF means test does not
compzrt with the discretionary role of courts.' 1 4 They criticize
relying on the means test to calculate disposable income as being a
c test devoid of discretion or even common sense" 15
"
n
In some cases, the courts seem to use reverse logic in arguing
that if the plain l
of the statute is -absurd," then the
statute as written cannot be what Congress intended it to mean.1 6
This alone seems to reflect a heightened judicial role in
interpreting a statute. Thus, Starting Point courts hig
t
judxml discetion in conjunction with the "those who can pay, do '
paicy to support their position.
2.

Legislative History, Policy, and Judicial Function Under
the HisorialApproach

Historical courts rely heavily on Congress' intentions to limit
hankruptcy courts' discretion and adopt a more mechanical test to
govern bankruptcy proce ngS117
The most convincing
coge onal intent argument under the Historical approach is

110. 151 COxG. R.
11I

Sze Insr &

S2459-01, S2459.
374 BR. at 20-21 (au

that the means test may go

agamnst the paey of dicuraging abusers by in'muduchn J a new means for
abuse Gf the system for "pp
debtors).fn,
the curt
admits that its decisn "may not whstand the test of time and -is an
educated goess,
more" Id at 23-24112. I&re Mqy, 381RIat 507.
113. In re Gonzales, 388 BR. at 295.

114. In re Laphut 363 BIt at 295.
115. 1&at 265.
116. ha e S
378 B.R. at 203 (ciming,"Congress surely did not
i
.ntemd
to create such a system"). The 'system" spoken of was one inMhch
there were two different tests for above and Mow median debtors, one

hitza:

117. Se

and the other

In re Pb,

'fue-aeteoV.Id&

373 B.].

at 434 (q

-

In re Barr, 341 B.I. 181, 185

(Bamk-. MJ-N.C. 20M)) (mating the desire for a"
app.f:),
te.ele2s. this cout still called forand J. I& at 436.

test to be rigdly
S
du

ting
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that Chapter 13 Trustees recognized the problem of interpretation
early on and made their concerns known to Congress 1 18 The
Trustees asked that the means test be a minimum or starting
point for projected disposable income, but Congress did not
incorporate any changes into the statute. 119 This makes it difficult
to argue that this was not the scheme enacted by Congress or that
the results of applying the statute are somehow "absurd" or
"unintended"
The Historical approach argues that Starting Point courts are
reverting to pre-BAPCPA policies by looking at Schedules I and J,
which was the method of determining disposable income before the
amendment in 2005.2
Thus, Historical courts claim that the
Starting Point approach acts to impermissibly undermine policy
choices made by Congress-72 1 One court even went so far as to
discuss the purpose of an amendment saying, "[tlhe obvious intent
of the amendment is to change, not preserve, the way that
disposable income is calculatedIs
Frequently, courts adopting the Historical view point out the
flaws in the Starting Point approach, where policy considerations,
such as "those who can pay, shold," are used as "a basis to
disregard the actual language of the enacted legislation."
As
one court said, "[wihile this may constitute a dramatic change
from pre-BAPCPA policy-and a point upon which reasonable
118 In re A/exander, 344 BJ. at 747-48; see also Marianne B. CuIhane &
Miiaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors- Is the Means Test the Only
Way?, 13 AM. BANKE. INsT. LRv.665, 682 (2005) (explaining that tustees
made repeated efforts to Congress to change the test).
119. IdJ
120. See In re McChrty, 376 BK at 823; (noting that Congress created a
"strict mathematic moder); see also In re Farrar-Johnson,353 RJR. at 229
(noting that letting Schedule J in "would -undo what Congress sought to
accomplish" in limiting judicial involvement and discretion); Brief of the

United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 74, at 18
(noting that a view that always incorporated Schedules I and J would be "as if
Congress's rewriting of section 1325 were meant to accomplish nothing').
Here, the court recognized that there was no "statutory basis" for requiring
courts to consider Schedules Iand J, while still advocating a flexible approach
to determining "projected disposable income IL
121. In re McCarty, 376 BA at 823; see also In re Kageweama, 541 F.3d at
875 (stating that a court cannot unlink the terms projected disposable income

and disposable income "simply to arrive at a more favorable result for
unsecured creditors, especially when the plain text and precedent dictate the

linkage of the two terms"); Brief of NACBA, supra note 96, at 17-18 (arguing
that the opposite view would overturn policy decisions that meant to create a
"consistent and appropriate method" to determine ability to pay.').

This

decision also notes that Congress tried to balance the interests of secured and
unsecured creditor I at 18.
122. In re Greer, 388 Bi.. 889, 893 (Bankr. C.D. ilL 2008) (treating the
calculation as a starting point "eviscerates the purpose and effect of the

historical average-).
123. Waldron & Berman, supru note 73,at 218.
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minds may differ-it is well within the prerogative of our
Legislative branch to make such changes. It is the role of the
Judicial branch to carry them out."124 Thus, Historical courts
highlight the role of the judiciary versus the role of the
legislature. 125 They frequently remind the Starting Point courts
that it is not their "role to change Congress' intentional policy
126
choices or save it from its inadvertent drafting errors."
While this disagreement might be seen as simply one of many
"interpretive divides," the projected disposable income calculation
goes to the heart of a Chapter 13 plan, since the calculation
determines what the debtor must pay.1 27 Here, controversy and
lack of uniformity can lead to fundamental unfairness.1 28 Debtors
in different courts might receive near-diametrically opposed
treatment. In the case of Section 1325, Historical courts seem

124. In re Austin, 372 B.R. at 679.
125. See In re Pak, 357 B.R. 549, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that
"[i]f Congress had wished to prevent such debtors from falling through the
statutory cracks, it could have provided an express provision preventing them
from doing so"); see also David W. Allard, The Means Test: Seeing Clearly the
CMI, 26-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2007) (noting that CMI, and income
reported on Schedule I, are "two very different calculations"). Here, Allard
questions whether IRS Schedules I and J can be considered for above-median
debtors in Chapter 13. Id.
126. In re Hanks, 362 B.R. at 502 (explaining that "[i]t bears repeating that
Congress' function is to legislate while the Court's function is to interpret and
apply the law as written instead of a law that the Court might find more
logical or reasonable"); see also In re McCarty, 376 B.R. at 823 (reasoning that
"[w]hile there may be sound reasons to rewrite section 1325(b), it is not the
role of this court to do so."). In this way, many courts seem to recognize that
the new code is problematic but are unwilling to go beyond their judicial role.
Id.
127. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 531.
128. Many commentators have discussed the lack of uniformity in the
Bankruptcy Code. The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy." U.S. CONST. art.1, §8 (emphasis
added). However, there is still debate on how much uniformity is possible and
whether it is even desirable. Some argue that the means test may violate the
Constitution's uniformity clause. Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalIssues
Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 592-94 (2005). Yet others have claimed that the
means test attempted to fit debtors into a "one size fits all" test that is too
uniform. Richard L. Wiener, Susan Block Lieb, Karen Gross & Corinne
Baron-Donovan, Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic
Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy,
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 454 (2005); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or
Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 169, 177 (2005) (making the point that local legal culture does not
allow bankruptcy law to be completely uniform). Specifically, Jacoby states
that "it is never the case that the legal system of any country is uniform,
unified, and able to cover the whole country like a smooth coat of paint." Id. at
176-77 (quoting Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology
of TransnationalLaw, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 67 (1996)).
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correct that courts must follow the law as written; "[s]tatutory
interpretation may be an art, but it must not be artful."'129 The
solution is to amend Section 1325.
IV.

PROPOSAL

This Section will propose an amendment that changes the
method of determining disposable income for above-median income
debtors to a percentage-based requirement. Next, this Section will
discuss how this amendment would accommodate congressional
intent, policy, and the judicial role under BAPCPA. This proposal
addresses these concerns, while highlighting the need to change
attitudes about BAPCPA in order to successfully move forward in
reforming the Code.
A.

Solving the DisposableIncome Problem

When President Clinton signed into law the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, he charged the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission with examining and critiquing the bankruptcy system
and the Code. 130 The Commission recognized the problem of lack
of success, lack of uniformity, and abuse of the Chapter 13
system.1 3' Much of the Commission's findings revolved around

129. U.S. v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1967). See Drobish, supra
note 64, at 212-14. Some commentators have pointed to the "atrocious
drafting" of the statute, but noted that Congress would have to fix these
mistakes. See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense out of Nonsense:
Representing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 192 (stating that
"[t]he silver lining for consumer debtors is that the bill is so poorly drafted
that it may not accomplish much of what its financial backers wanted to
accomplish").
130. See The National Bankruptcy Review Commission Archive,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/facts.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008)
(providing facts on the establishment and make-up of the National
The Commission was established to
Bankruptcy Review Commission).
investigate, study, and review the current Bankruptcy Code, and propose
solutions to perceived problems. Id. The President, Congress, and Chief
Justice selected the members, and the Commission was to submit a report no
later than two years from the first meeting. Id.
131. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 233-36.
The Commissioners here explain that the hearings "were peppered with
illustrations of the lack of uniformity." Id. at 235. The Commissioners made
it clear that judicial discretion is important, but claimed that the nonuniformity was "more deeply rooted" so that debtors in similar circumstances
would be subject to extremely different plans and requirements. Id. They
described the difference from circuit to circuit as "so divergent that they alter
the basic requirements of the Chapter 13 bargain." Id. The Commission also
touched on the lack of plan success, often with no remedy at all available for
the debtor, and the problems associated with "savvy debtors who can exploit
some provisions to extraordinary advantage." Id. at 235. Their concerns are
illustrative because although many claim that the views of the Commission
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ensure that Chapter 13 is successful in paying unsecured creditors
is requiring above-median income debtors to pay back a set
percentage of their unsecured debtY'
Courts would still differentiate between below and abovemedian income debtors via the means tesL Under this percentagebased system, however, they would take a set percentage of their
CMI to pay to unsecured creditors over the plan-ias
This approach is not new; the Commission noted that some
courts already used a percentage-based test, recommending a
graduated percentage based on income. lm Rather than the
graduated scheme proposed by the Commission, under this
proposal, only above-median income debtors would use the
percentage requirement which could then be graduated according
to income or remain a fixed rate.
In order to keep the CMI calculation up-to-date, Chapter 13
debtors should be required to recalculate their CMI calculations
every six months.140 Many have suggested for increased disclosure
during plans, 141 although it has been argued by some that
requiring debtors to disclose tax forms annually may be
unconstitutional142
A continued flow of information would
increase the accuracy of plan payout amounts for above-median
debtors and account for changes in circumstances after filing.
Under the percentage model, a Chapter 13 debtor could not
receive the benefits of the superdischarge before completing the
plan- Still there remains the problem of Chapter 13 debtors who
use the system to cure arrearages on secured debt with no intent
to complete a plan, therefore paying nothing to unsecured
creditors. The remedy for this issue is to require debtors to pay
secured and unsecured creditors in conjunction, rather than
frontloading secured debt payments. 14 3
While there may be

unsecured creditors, even though they were the ones who pushed so long for

reform).
137. NATONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COM

OSsON,
supranote 43, at 263-73.
138. This is similar to the suggestion by the Commission that debtors below
a certain income level would only be required to make nominal payment. Id.
at 268. Instead, this proposal uses the means test as a dividing line,
maintaining the use of the means test in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.

139. The Commission discussed but did not make a recommendation as to
Section 707(b) incorporation of a means test. I& at 272.

140. This alone could increase the relevancy and usefulness of the current
monthly income calculation- Current monthly income in the Chapter 13
context would require a percentage of what the debtor actually did receive on

average in the last six months. Instead of forcing a court to look into its
"crystal ball" to somehow see the future.
141. See Jones & Shepard, supra note 133 (arguing that Chapter 13 plans
should be reviewed annually, and modified if a debtors income goes up or

down).
142- Chemerinsky, supra note 39, at 596-99.
143. NATIONAL BANKRUPY REVIEW COMMISSION, supranote 43, at 262-63.
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concern about the ability of debtors to comply with this while
attempting to cure arrearages, the plan could also provide a grace
period for the debtor to begin catching up on these payments.
While this part of the structure is described as "the stick," it
is an incentive in itself to complete plans. The desire to keep
property and complete payments on secured debts would
encourage debtors to budget and finish plan payments more
carefully.144 This proposal only briefly touches on some other
incentives and the other aspect of the Chapter 13 plan, the
''carrot."
2. A FatterCarrot
The carrot portion of this proposal goes beyond the scope of
this Comment and is not integral to solving the projected
disposable income problem. On the other hand, incentives to
debtors filing under Chapter 13 may increase the success of these
145
One option is to change credit-reporting practices.
plans.
Credit reports should reflect what chapter a debtor is filing under
and the percentage of their unsecured debts that they will repay
under in their Chapter 13 plan. 146 Upon completion of a Chapter
13 plan (in this case of an above-median income debtor, five years),
the bankruptcy should be removed from their report after one
year. 147 Unsecured creditors lobbied for nearly fifty years to get
people into Chapter 13; this is a way for them to actively

The Commission suggested distributing secured debt payments over the life of
the plan. Id. at 262. The Commission did note, however, that this could
increase the risk of plan failure. Id.
144. Id. at 269. The Commission also touched on the possibility that this
could "complement efforts to improve debtors' budgeting practices, while they
promote debtor autonomy in determining what expenses fit their budgets." Id.
They also noted that this, in contrast with disposable income, does not provide
a disincentive from the debtor to increase productivity. Id. Ultimately, this
model would encourage a debtor to succeed and take advantage of a fresh
start. Id.
145. Id. at 292-93. The Commission argued for changing these reporting
practices, including adding and refining the information used in credit
reporting. Id.
146. Arguments to change credit-reporting practices to reflect what chapter
a debtor is filing under have been very common. Id.; see also ABI REFORM
SUMMARY, supra note 134, app. G1.a at 8-9 (noting that bankruptcies should
be reported by chapter, and the percentage repaid under Chapter 13 should be
reported). The Commission takes the position that bankruptcy should be
deleted from the report after plan completion and that finance education
programs should also be recorded. Id.; see also Jones & Shepard, supra note
133 (proposing that credit reporting reflect plan completion, percentage of debt
paid, and whether debt counseling/education was completed). The Fair Credit
Reporting Act currently deletes bankruptcy report after 10 years. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(c) (2006).
147. This would allow removal from a credit report after six years under
Chapter 13 rather than ten years under Chapter 7.
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encourage individuals to file under this chapter. 148
Another possibility is to restore the "super" in the
superdischarge. 149
Options include restoring the ability to
discharge certain tax debts and student loans.150 Government
loans could remain non-dischargeable, but the code could allow
discharge of private student loans with high-interest rates that are
deemed predatory. Similarly, the tax discharge could be expanded
to include taxes incurred beyond one year, as opposed to three.

B. Accomplishing the Dual Purpose of BAPCPA and
Rethinking Our Approach to JudicialFunctionand Policy
1.

Carryingout the Purpose of BAPCPA

While many suggest that Congress ignored the findings of the
Commission in enacting BAPCPA, Congress at least attempted to
address some of their concerns.1 51
The problem with the
disposable income test as written is that it failed to accomplish the
goals of BAPCPA.
This amendment, while changing the
disposable income test, achieves what Congress intended to
accomplish under BAPCPA.152 Judicial discretion is limited, a
bright-line and uniform rule is enacted, and unsecured creditors
1 53
receive more of a payout.

148. In their 1996 report on the bankruptcy system, Visa noted the
importance of better education and awareness about bankruptcy alternatives.
Visa, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR SURVEY, July 1996,
http://www.abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Newsroom/BankruptcyRese
archCenter/BankruptcyReportsResearchandTestimony/General/BankruptcyD
ebtorSI.htm. Visa stated they initiated programs to promote consumer credit
counseling and improve the accuracy of credit reports. Id.
149. See NATIONAL BANKRuPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 43, at
288-91 (noting that the superdischarge is consistent with the Congressional
intent of providing incentives for choosing Chapter 13).
150. See ABI REFORM SUMMARY, supra note 134, app. G-1.a at 7-8
(suggesting a restoration of the superdischarge for student loans and possibly
some tax debts).
151. See sources cited supra note 128 (explaining the various findings of the
Commission).
Many of these findings are the same concerns which led
Congress to enact BAPCPA.
152. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 263-66.
The Commission noted that the disposable income method falls short of the
policy behind Chapter 13 in that it rewards debtors who "over-encumber their
budgets." Id. at 266. While analyzing the system's pre-means test, this
criticism is also applicable to the means test system where debtors are able to
deduct all payments on secured debts from their disposable income
calculation.
153. The Commission noted that setting uniform standards for expenses
would not necessarily accomplish the goals of limiting abuse and increasing
payout. Id. at 266-67. They noted that this would give debtors an "incentive
to build budgets around the rules." Id. at 267. This is the same issue of abuse
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It is clear that other proposed solutions fail to achieve these
three goals.
Neither judicial approach, Starting Point or
intent
adequately
effectuates
congressional
Historical,
Academics and others grappling with the issue of calculating
disosable income in Chapter 13 have recognized the need for an
amendment, but their solutions do little to implement the purpose

and policy of BAPCPA.
One suggestion is to effectively write the Starting Point
approach into the Code.5 Treating the means test as a strtig
point for determining projected disposable income, however,
represents a reversion to pre-BAPCPA practice and policies.lw
Limiting judicial discretion in defining disposable income was one
of the goals of the BAPCPA amendmentS. 5 7 While using the
means test as a starting point somewhat limits discretion, a zero
or negative plan puts that floor at zero and results in an almost
entirely discretionary payment calculation
Therefore, this
solution does little to resolve the very issue posed in this article.
2. JudicialDiscretion and Role under BAPCPA
While many judges, academics, and lawyers decried BAPCPA
for limitng judicial discretion, discretion for judges cannot solve
the disposable income problem. Neither CMI nor Schedules I and
J could ever be true "crystal ba58s that can tell the future.us To
te
the extent that any judge uses these tools alone to c

that comes into play with the current means test.

and
statutory
See supra Part
the f
of the Startig Point appr a MLC-2 (
Courts defer to Congress and the lnguae it used in Section 1325, but the
result is not what Congrss mntended See supr Parts HLB-, HLC.2
e
Courts give to the statutory
(describing the mea g that
and the unwilge of srmica Courts to use pre-BAPCPA policies in
Sectio 1325.
155. See Drobish, supra note 64, at 211-14 (prosig
an amendment where
154 St

conrsnal

g Point courts would merely be

-

intent by revertng to pre-BAPCPA policies.

ate disable
the means test would act as a startiog point from which to
ncome for above-median icome debt ors). Dtbish claims that this would

eradicate much of the u

and injustne fund within the

Code- I& at 214.

156. See spra note 120 (diuss
how Starting Point courts use preBAPCPA policies in intepreting the Code).
157. Sc saprm Part ULB (expling how Congress intemeed to redune
158. See In m Guzman, 345 B.B. 640, 645 (Bankr El). Wis 2MM3 (c
Form B22C a 'rear view mirrmw and Schedules I and J a "crystal barW).
159. See Henry K Hilde
I, Ifapar of the B
Ah

-g

Precenmon ad Conswzver ProonrionAct of 200L5 om Chapter 113 Thzsfeac, 79

i
L. 373, 389 (2M5) (saying that "ItJhe dcae t is,
tharefwe, no gnger a reliable means to gauge the debtoes ability to pay')
, however, how the previus test was ever an
(emphasis add). It is
=anote measure of future Income.
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disposable income, they are nothing more than fortune tellers.
Giving a judge the discretion to increase or decrease a
debtor's projected disposable income does not somehow create a
more accurate picture of where a debtor will be five, three, or even
one year from filing bankruptcy. Future uncertainty is the most
obvious failing point of Chapter 13 plans. A percentage-based
system does not require judges to predict the future; it requires
debtors to pay back a portion of what they actually earnedOther attempts to solve the disposable income calculation
reflect efforts to add judicial discretion into BAPCPA, although
Congress clearly intended otherwise160 One such attempt was
brought up when debating the 2005 amendments before passage of
BAPCPA 161 Senator Russ Feingold argued for inserting a "special
circumstances" line on Form B22C and into Section 1325.m The
Senator claimed that this would eliminate problems with inflated
or deflated income calculations when determining the disposable
income requirement for above-median debtors-163 The idea was
that a judge could decrease plan payout amounts based on these
special circumstances in the interest of fairness or accuracy.
However, Form B22C now includes this line,'" and it is not
clear that this will alleviate the problem.
The "special
circumstances7 line is used to lower the income calculation, not to
increase it.1f Thus, this solution might help those with artificially
high income calculations, but it does nothing to solve the issue of
above-median income Chapter 13 debtors with zero or negative
income calculations.
Moreover, this remedy highlights the
problem with attempting to solve disposable income with
increased judicial discretion.
Courts often differ on what
constitute special circumstances, exacerbating the lack of
uniformity that comes along with the discretion that Congress
sought to eliminate-16
In addition, many commentators criticize BAPCPA for
blurring administrative and judicial functions, arguing that the
160. These attempts came from the view that judicial discretion was the only
way to ensure that disposable income calculations were fair and acurate. See
supra Part IMC.1 (describing the Starting Point courts" approach to

interpreting Section 1325).
161- 151 CONG. REC. S23064)2, S2315.

162- 1&L Here, Senator Feingold argued that they should not import the
means test without allowing for special circumstances adjustments- Id
163. I&
164- Clifford J. White m & David A Levine, Changes to the Official Means
Test Forms and !RS Standards Effetive Jan, 1, 27-FEB AMc BANKR.

INSr.

J.

18, 69 (2008) (noting the addition of a "special circumstances' line on Form
22C for debtors to claim additional expenses due to special circumstances).
165. See id (noting that debtors could use the new line to "deduct additional

expenses not allowed under § 707(bX2)(Ay).
166 See supra Part ILB. (explaining BAPCPA and the intent behind
enacting it).
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means test has created more administrative work for judges. 167
But a rigid test implicates a movement towards an administrative
view of bankruptcy, which many of those same critics have
espoused, hoping to set up a separate administrative agency to
deal with bankruptcy issues where litigation is not necessary.
BAPCPA may have blurred distinctions, but it could also be seen
as a step closer to such a model.
A percentage-based income calculation could make the
bankruptcy process less complicated and less expensive. 168 In this
way, this proposal provides a good method of moving towards a
more administrative view of the bankruptcy system and a
heightened involvement for the United States Trustee. 169 The
more judicial discretion written into the Code, the more judicial
involvement implicated in what could be an increasingly
administrative process.
3.

Defending and Implementing BAPCPA Policy

Proposals for solving disposable income are hampered by the
desire to ignore congressional intent and to ignore the policies
providing the backdrop for BAPCPA.
A percentage-based
amendment to Section 1325 hopes to look past the animosity
towards BAPCPA, resolving to limit the judicial discretion in
determining what a plan pays to unsecured creditors and to
ensure those creditors get more payout in Chapter 13.
Academics, 170 professionals, judges, and debtors have painted
a bleak picture of the new statutory scheme under BAPCPA.
167. See Pardo, supra note 21, at 488-94 (using models to show the blurring
of administrative and judicial functions under BAPCPA). However, Pardo
later points out that BAPCPA might be "an emerging and evolving
reorientation away from the judicial character of bankruptcy law." Id. at 494.
168. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 267.

The Commission noted that this could actually make Chapter 13 simpler and
provide for judicial resources to be allocated towards legal disputes. Id.
169. See Pardo, supra note 21, at 472 (explaining that, "[miore than
anything else, the means test is a story about institutional design-that is, the
manner in which Congress would like courts to function within the
bankruptcy system"). "The means test evinces a deep mistrust of the preBAPCPA discretion that had been exercised by the bankruptcy judiciary in its
gatekeeper role under the substantial abuse dismissal regime .... " Id. at 47273. This article notes the concern of blurring the judicial and administrative
functions; however, it does so by emphasizing the "persistence of judicial
discretion under the abuse dismissal regime." Id. at 479. This article makes a
suggestion that many others do: courts should be relieved of handling
administrative functions and an administrative agency should be empowered
to handle matters that do not involve litigation. Id. at 489.
170. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 129, at 191 (beginning his article by
stating, "[flrom its Orwellian title, an example of deceptive advertising if ever
there was one"). The author notes that "[t]he silver lining.., is that the bill is
so poorly drafted that it may not accomplish much of what its financial
backers wanted to accomplish." Id. at 192.
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Since 2005, many have claimed that Congress made it impossible
to file for bankruptcy and that Congress has adopted a new
"debtor's prison." Critics seem to denounce both the statutory
drafting and the policy behind it.
The policy behind BAPCPA, however, is at least theoretically
sound. 171 While the means test makes theoretical sense, in
172
practice it did not translate into Chapter 13 as intended.
Making the disposable income requirement a percentage-based
calculation embraces BAPCPA policy, rather than rebelling
against it.
A percentage requirement, like the means test,
attempts to accomplish a bright-line rule that does not vary from
courthouse to courthouse. 173 While there may always be those who
take advantage of the system and it may never achieve true
uniformity, this proposal does justice to the policies underlying
BAPCPA. 174
Whether driven by credit card companies or not, Congress
attempted to enact a scheme where debtors who were able to pay
off their debts would do so. The policy being that a debtor should
have a minimal standard of living based on their location and
family size. A percentage requirement has this same policy in
mind. Congress has allowed debtors to deduct from their income
payments for cars, cell phones, houses, health insurance,
175
This is no debtor's prison. 176
education expenses, and more.
171. U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, SUGGESTIONS ON BEHALF OF U.S. TRUSTEE,
app. F-3, at 6, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html
(suggesting the introduction of tools for the United States Trustee to combat
fraud and abuse in the bankruptcy code).
172. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 43, at
263-66 (advocating a percentage graduated by income). The Commission
noted that a "disposable income" requirement has appeal to debtors and
creditors alike because it seems that debtors will pay out whatever is excess in
their budget, but the reality has been that often there is little or no payment
to unsecured creditors. Id. at 263. Furthermore, the Commission again points
out the lack of uniformity under the test (although this is a pre-means test).
Id. at 264-65.
173. The means test is painted as a harsh anti-debtor mechanism, but there
are many arguments that it is at least theoretically sound. See Hubler, supra
note 3, at 329-38 (claiming that there are legal, social, and economic
justifications for means testing). Hubler points to the legal justification of a
universally applicable test, the social justification of a fresh start for only
those in need, and the economic justification of promoting affordable and
available credit. Id. at 329, 331, 334; see also Dickerson, supra note 45, at 244
(explaining that the theory behind the means test is "theoretically sound
because it is not irrational" to have debtors repay debts that are within their
means).
174. See Jacoby, supra note 128, at 190 (pointing out that "day-to-day system
players" are the ones who are "shaping the actual impact of statutory
revisions"). On the other hand, Jacoby notes that her position is not a "sign of
rebellion" and that she is "[rieserving judgment about the impact of the bill."
Id.
175. See Official Bankruptcy Form 22C, supra note 49 (laying out these
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Yet the bankruptcy system is also not mere charty or
welfare. Percentage-based Chapter 13 plans would lead to greater
success rates, which are empowering for both debtors and
creditors. Giving debtors a fresh start and creditors fair treatment
promotes lower-cos credit and entrepreneurial risk taking- For
many years, these values have been a foundation of American
socety. In recent years, we have seen the vulnerability of that
foundation and the tightening of credit markets. A percentagebased requirement responds to these haging concerns by more
evenly ba c
the hardships and risks of bankruptcy,a concept
at the heart of United States bankruptcy policy.
V.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 gives debtors an opportunity to keep their
p
ty and d
more debt, but, in return, give back to
ucreditors.
Whe sound in policy, Chapter 13 is largely
unsuand
BAPCPA has opened new loopholes. Now, more
than ever, the viability and success of Chapter 13 should he a
priority. With foreresure now known to so many Americans, some
have argued to give relief to homeowners in Chapter 13.111
BAPCPA has come to the forefront in a time of fiaci
turmoil
and uncertainty- A percentage-based plan reqirment for abovemedian income debtors will make Chapter 13 plans both fair and
successful
The proposals and commentary on BAPCPA are clouded with
s
"The system was not broken-. .N.
ut
the coures lob is to interpret the new statute as cearty written,
not to no
gicaly preserve the past --- "
Courts, debtors,
academics, and professionals are all suffering from a nsa
that hinders progess in reorming the Code, perfect
both the
statutory language and scheme. It is now time to give up the
nosaha and move
forward into a "new era in the history of
"
bankuptcy law.1
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